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Abstract—This paper adopts the antenna selection technique
to enhance the covert rate in a wireless communication network
comprised of a source, a destination , an external jammer and an
eavesdropper. In the covert communication, the level of transmit
power is low and hence a source with multiple antennas can
be adopted to send the information toward the single antenna
destination while concurrently, the jammer transmits an artificial
noise signal. For this system model, we consider a scenario where
the source is forced to select one or several of its antennas to
transmit its confidential information due to its limited RF chains.
Furthermore, we consider two different jamming scenarios to
support our covert communication: 1) The destination is unable
to cancel the jamming signal, 2) The destination can subtract
the jamming signal. For such a communication network, our
aim is to maximize the covert rate subject to power constraint
and covert communication requirement. In the first scenario, the
optimization problem is non-convex, and hence, it can be solved
through using Difference of Convex function (DC) method while
the optimization problem of the second scenario is intrinsically
convex. Our numerical results show that the higher the number
of selected antennas at the transmitter, the higher the covert rate
will be achieved.
Index Terms—covert communication, antenna selection, exter-
nal jammer.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is a critical and important subject in wireless com-
munications networks. This is because the broadcast nature
of wireless networks permits to the unauthorized nodes to
access the contents of the confidential messages [1]. Physical
layer security as a new solution to enhance the confidentiality
of wireless communications has attracted a lot of interest
[2]–[4]. Physical layer secure transmission is provisioned by
intelligently exploiting the time varying properties of fading
channels, instead of relying on conventional cryptographic
techniques. This approach uses signal processing and encoding
techniques at the physical layer, to improve the quality of
the received signal at illegitimate receivers compared with the
unauthorized users. Toward this end, the jamming signal can
be used to enhance the physical layer security. Typically, there
are two main types of jamming signal to enhance the secu-
rity of wireless networks [4], [5]: 1) Friendly jamming (FJ)
scenario where the jamming signal is known at the legitimate
receiver, 2) Gaussian noise jamming (GNJ) where the jamming
signal is unknown at the legitimate receiver[5]-[7]. It should be
noted that FJ provides better secrecy performance compared
with GNJ because when FJ is used, legitimate receiver can
cancel the jamming signal. However, GNJ is more simple
compared with FJ scenario. This reveals the trade-off between
secrecy performance and complexity of the network.
In some communication networks, low probability of detec-
tion(LPD) or covert communication is essential for informa-
tion transmission over electromagnetic and acoustic channels
[8]. For military applications, LPD is interest when the trans-
mitter wishes to remain undetected, or when the knowledge
of communication may point to the presence of a receiver. As
such, in covert communication only the detection capability of
an eavesdropper is considered, i.e., an eavesdropper need not
be able to actually decode the communication signal. In other
words, the covert communication keeps military forces from
possible attacks [9]. In recent years, some few works have
investigated the covert communication in different wireless
communication networks [9]–[14].
In this paper, we take into account the power allocation
problem of a wireless communication network, where a mul-
tiple antenna source transmits its confidential message to
a single antenna destination in the presence of a passive
eavesdropper. To covert the communication against the eaves-
dropping attack, a single antenna external jammer is employed.
For this communication network, we investigate two different
jamming scenarios to support covert communication: 1) The
destination is unable to cancel the jamming signal, i.e., we
have FJ, 2) The destination can subtract the jamming signal,
i.e., we have GNJ. We consider a realistic scenario where
the number of RF chains at the source may be fewer than
the number of source’s antennas. Instead of selecting the
antennas randomly, we propose to select the best antennas
to transmit the information signal toward the destination. For
such a network, we formulate the power allocation between
the source and jammer that maximizes the instantaneous covert
rate while concurrently hiding the communication against the
passive eavesdropping attack. Since the optimization problem
of GNJ scenario is non-convex, we exploit difference of
concave (DC) approach to convert it to a convex optimization
problem. For the FJ scenario, we observe that the optimization
problem is convex. We also obtain closed-form solutions for
the optimal power threshold from the eavesdropper’s view-
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Fig. 1. Our MISO system model in the presence of an external jammer and
a passive eavesdropper.
point. Our numerical examples show that by increasing the
number of selected antennas at the transmitter the covert rate is
increased. Furthermore, the impact of the distance between the
transmitter and the eavesdropper on the achievable covert rate
is more than the impact of the distance between the transmitter
and the receiver.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig. 1, the system model under considera-
tion is a multi-input single-output (MISO) wireless network
consisting of an MT antenna transmitter (Alice), a single
antenna jammer, a single antenna receiver (Bob), and a single
antenna eavesdropper (Eve). For this system model, assume
Alice selects several antennas to send information signal and
also, the jammer sends jamming signal in all directions. In
this scenario, we assume the communication channels fol-
low the slow fading. Moreover, the fading coefficients have
Rayleigh distribution. Alice is unaware of Eve’s channel state
information (CSI) and only knows the distance between itself
and Eve. We also assume that the jammer knows the distance
between itself and Eve. The distance between Alice and Bob,
Alice and Eve, the jammer and Bob and the jammer and
Eve are defined as Dab, Dae, Djb and Dje, respectively.
The information signal and the jamming signal denoted by
Xs =
[
xs
1, xs
2, .., xs
m
]
and Xj =
[
xj
1, xj
2, .., xj
m
]
,
respectively, where m shows the number of time slots.
III. COVERT COMMUNICATION
In the covert communication, our aim is to send a message
from Alice to Bob secretly such that Eve will not be notified
of this communication, i.e., based on the level received energy.
The Eve decides about the presence or absence of signal
transmission by Alice. In this scenario, notation Ω0 states
that Alice does not transmit the information signal to Bob,
while Ω1 states that the Alice transmits the information signal
to Bob. If we assume P (Ω0) = 1 − p and P (Ω1) = p, the
probability of error at Eve according to its decisions is defined
as follows
Pe = (1− p)PFA + pPMD, (1)
where PMD is the probability that Alice sends its information
signal but Eve decides on the absence of communication.
Furthermore, PFA is the probability that Alice is silent but
Eve decides on the presence of communication between Alice
and Bob. The covert communication between Alice and Bob
is established when the following condition holds [12]
PFA + PMD
n→∞
≥ 1− ε. (2)
The received signal at node k ∈ Bob,Eve, is as follows
yk =

√
pjhjkxj
D
β/2
jk
+ nk, Ω0,
√
pjhjkxj
D
β/2
jk
+
√
psw
Hhakxs
D
β/2
ak
+ nk, Ω1,
(3)
where ps and pj are the allocated power for the informa-
tion signal and the jamming signal, respectively, such that
ps = αPtotal and pj = (1 − α)Ptotal, where α is the
power allocation factor. It is worth noting that the total power
consumption constraint provides a guideline for the power
allocation of the Alice and the jammer. This approach has
been widely exploited in the literature for both performance
analysis and network optimization design [7], [11], [14].
Furthermore, in (3), β is the path-loss exponent. Note that
w = hab‖hab‖ represents the maximum ratio transmission (MRT)
beamformer at the source and nk is the white Gaussian noise
received at node k with the distribution of n ∼ CN(0, σ2k).
hak, and hjk are the channel coefficients of the information
signal and the jamming signal, respectively.
The decision of Eve is based on the energy of the received
signal. Eve decides on the state Ω1 if Yem ≥ V . Otherwise, Eve
decides on the state Ω0. V is the threshold of decision and Ye
is the energy of the received signal which is Ye =
m∑
l=1
∣∣ylk∣∣2.
Accordingly, PFA and PMD can be written, respectively, as
PFA = P ((σe
2 + γ)χ
2
2m
m ≥ V |Ω0 ), (4)
PMD = P ((σe
2 + γ)χ
2
2m
m ≤ V |Ω1 ), (5)
where χ22m is a random variable with chi-squared distribution
with 2m degrees of freedom. For large number of time slots,
m → ∞, we have χ22mm → 1. Therefore, (5) and (6) can be
simplified as
PFA = P ((σe
2 + γ) ≥ V |Ω0 ), (6)
PMD = P ((σe
2 + γ) ≤ V |Ω1 ). (7)
We note that the received signal has the distribution of ylk ∼
CN(0, (σ2 + γ)), where γ is defined as follows
γ =

Pj
Dβae
|hje|2, Ω0,
Pj
Dβje
|hje|2 + PsDβae
∥∥wHhae∥∥2, Ω1. (8)
In (8), hje and hae are zero-mean Gaussian random variables
with unit variances. Thus, |hje|2 has an exponential distribu-
tion with the parameter λ = 1. Therefore, for the assumption
of Ω0 , γ has an exponential distribution with the parameter of
λ = 1φ0 . According to [15], the summation of two exponential
distributions x and y with parameters λ1 and λ2 is given by
fx+y(γ) =
λ1λ2
λ2 − λ1 [ e
−λ1γ − e−λ2γ ]U(γ), (9)
where U(γ) is the step function. Furthermore, γ is distributed
as follows
f(γ) =
{
1
φ0
e−
γ
φ0 , γ ≥ 0 Ω0,
1
φ0−φ1 (e
− γφ0 − e− γφ1 ), γ ≥ 0 Ω1,
(10)
where φ0 =
Pj
Dβje
and φ1 = PsDβae
. By combining (6), (7), (8)
and (10), we obtain
PFA =
{
e−
(V−σ2e)
φ0 , V − σ2e ≥ 0,
1, V − σ2e ≤ 0,
(11)
and
PMD =
{
Γ, V − σ2e ≥ 0,
0, V − σ2e ≤ 0, (12)
where Γ = 1φ0−φ1 (φ1e
− (V−σ
2
e)
φ1 − φ0e−
(V−σ2e)
φ0 + φ0 − φ1).
A. Eavesdropper’s error
The Eve’s error is defined as PMD +PFA. In this scenario,
we consider the worst case scenario where Eve has an optimal
threshold. The optimal threshold of Eve is minimum decision
error. Therefore, we can write
PMD + PFA =
{
e−
(V−σ2e)
φ0 + Λ1, V − σ2e ≥ 0,
1, V − σ2e ≤ 0,
(13)
where
Λ1 =
1
φ0 − φ1 (φ1e
− (V−σ
2
e)
φ1 − φ0e−
(V−σ2e)
φ0 + φ0 − φ1). (14)
The minimum Eve’s error will be
min
V
(PFA + PMD) = e
− φ1Aφ1−φ0 + Λ2, (15)
where
Λ2=
1
φ0 − φ1 (φ1e
− φ0φ1−φ0A − φ0e−
φ1
φ1−φ0A + φ0 − φ1), (16)
where A = Lnφ1φ0 and the optimal threshold is given by
V ∗ =
φ0φ1
φ1 − φ0Ln
φ1
φ0
+ σ2e . (17)
Proof : See Appendix A. 
B. Covert rate
The covert rate at Bob is defined as
R = log(1 +
αPtotal|hab|2Dβjb
DβjbD
β
abσ
2
b + (1− α)Ptotal|hjb|2Dβab
). (18)
Our goal is to increase the covert rate. To this end, from
the MT antennas, ND of antennas with the highest channel
coefficients between Alice and Bob are selected to send the
information. As such, the corresponding antennas are selected
based on the following criterion
hab = XND (sort(HMT×1)), (19)
where sort(v) arranges the v elements in descending order
and Xi(u) selects first i elements of u. According to (19),
we can increase the covert rate by selecting appropriate
antennas for sending information signal. The proposed antenna
selection technique, not only increases the covert rate, but also
reduces the hardware equipments at Alice, including amplifiers
and mixers, and also reduces the network complexity and
overhead.
IV. OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
In this paper, our goal is to maximize the covert rate
subject to the limitation of transmit power and the covert
communication condition. Moreover, in the following, we
investigate two different scenarios of FJ and GNJ.
A. Gaussian Noise Jamming Scenario
In this scenario, it is assumed that Bob cannot cancel the
jamming signal. Therefore, we have the following optimization
problem
max
α
{R = log(1 + αPtotal|hab|
2Dβjb
DβjbD
β
abσ
2
b+(1−α)Ptotal|hjb|2Dβab
)},
s.t C1 : 0 < α < 1,
C2 : min
V
(PFA + PMD) ≥ 1− ε.
(20)
After formulating the constraint C2 (See Appendix B), (20)
can be rewritten as follows
max
α
{R = log(1 + αPtotal|hab|
2Dβjb
DβjbD
β
abσ
2
b+(1−α)Ptotal|hjb|2Dβab
)},
s.t C1 : 0 < α < 1,
C2 :
(1−α)Dβje
(1−α)Dβae−αDβje
ln(
αDβje
(1−α)Dβae ) < lnε.
(21)
Since the optimization problem (22) is a non-convex one, we
rewrite the objective function as follows
Σ(α)−Ψ(α), (22)
where
Σ(α) = log(DβjbD
β
abσ
2
b + (1− α)PtotalDβab|hjb|2
+αPmaxD
β
jb‖hab‖2)
Ψ(α) = log(DβjbD
β
abσ
2
b + (1− α)PtotalDβab|hjb|2)
(23)
To solve the optimization problem, we use the DC method.
As such, we approximate Ψ(α) as follows [16]
Ψ(α) ' Ψ˜(α) = Ψ(α(η − 1))+
∇TΨ(α(η − 1))(α− α(η − 1)), (24)
where ∇ is the gradient operator and ∇TΨ(α(η − 1)) is
calculated as follows
∇TΨ(α(η − 1)) = −PtotalD
β
ab|hjb|2
DβjbD
β
abσ
2
b + (1− α(η − 1))PtotalDβab|hjb|2
.
(25)
Finally, (18) can be rewritten as Σ(α) − Ψ˜(α) which is a
concave function. C2 can be concave by using the change of
value T = (1− α)Dβae − αDβje. Therefore, we have
max
α
Σ(α)− Ψ˜(α)
s.t C1 : 0 < α < 1,
C2 : (1− α)Dβae ln(
αDβje
(1−α)Dβae ) < Tlnε,
C3 : (1− α)Dβae − αDβje < T.
(26)
Since the optimization problem in (26) is convex. we can use
the available softwares such as CVX solver to solve it.
B. Friendly Jamming Scenario
In this scenario, it is assumed that Bob can cancel the
jamming signal. Hence, we have the following optimization
problem
max
α
{R = log(1 + αPtotal|hab|2
Dβabσ
2
b
)},
s.t C1, C2.
(27)
In (27), the objective function is convex. Therefore, we can
use the CVX solver to solve it. In addition, we can convert
constraints C1 and C2 to convex constraints as in the previous
scenario.
V. SIMULATION RESULT
In this section, our aim is to evaluate the secrecy per-
formance of the proposed secure transmission scheme. For
simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that
Alice, Bob, the jammer and the passive Eve are located at
the positions (-2.5,2.5), (2.5,2.5), (2.5,-2.5) and (-2.5,-2.5),
respectively. Unless otherwise stated, the network parameters
are: number of antennas at Alice MT = 10, number of
antenna at Alice that are selected ND = 6, ε = 0.1, 1 − ε
is lower bound of error detection probability, and the path-
loss exponent β = 2.
Fig. 2 shows the effect of the transmit power sent by
Alice on the covert rate. According to simulation results,
if the transmit power increases, the covert rate increases.
However, as can be seen, the covert rate ceiling is appeared
at high transmit powers. This is because when the transmit
power increases, jammer transmits jamming signal with higher
power, hence, Alice can transmit information signal with
higher power which leads to increase covert rate. Furthermore,
we observe that by increasing the number of the best selected
antennas for signal transmission, the achievable covert rate
improves. For example, if the transmit power is constant
and the number of antennas which are selected for sending
information signal is doubled, the covert rate is reduced 27%.
However, the simulation results shows that the associated
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Fig. 2. Covert rate versus the total transmit power.
number of antennas should not be larger than 6 in order to
balance the performance gain and implementation cost. If the
number of antennas exceeds 6, in addition to Bob’s condition,
the Eve conditions will also improve for detection, which will
make our hidden rate not change significantly. Since allocating
large number of antennas for signal transmission imposes
more hardware equipments (RF chains), higher latency and
more much overhead to the network. Moreover, this figure
compares random antenna selection and proposed antenna
selection. It is necessary to note that random antenna selection
with ND = 4 has more efficiency with respect to proposed
method with ND = 1 and less efficiency with respect to
proposed method with ND = 2. The reason is when the
number of antennas increase diversity gain increases. But the
proposed method with less diversity gain has more efficiency
with respect to random antenna selection with higher diversity
gain. The Fig. 2 shows proposed method enhances the covert
rate approximately 2 times.
As we can see in Fig. 3, the lower the distance between
Alice and Bob, the higher the covert rate. In addition, the
lower the distance between Alice and Eve, the lower the covert
rate. Given Fig. 3, if the distance between Alice and Bob is
increased by 6 meters, the covert rate reduces about 62%.
Now, if the distance between Alice and Eve increases the
same amount, the cover rate increases about 4.7 times. Thus,
the impact of the distance between Alice and Eve is more
important than the distance between Alice and Bob. Also, as
shown in Figure 3, when the Bob can cancel the jamming
signal, the covert rate increases dramatically. For example, if
the distance between Alice and Jammer is 2 meters and Bob
cancels the jamming signal, the covert rate is 5.6 times more.
Also, in Fig. 4, we can see the effect of the distance between
the jammer and Bob and Eve on the covert rate. According
to simulation results, when Bob can not cancel the jamming
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
D
ab (m)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
C
ov
er
t r
at
e 
(n
at
 p
er
 se
co
nd
/H
z)
D
ae
=2 (m)
D
ae
=4 (m)
D
ae
=6 (m)
D
ae
=8 (m)
D
ae
=2 (m)
GNJ scenario
FJ scenario
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signal, the lower the distance between the jammer and Bob, the
lower the covert rate. For example, if the the distance between
the jammer and Bob from 3 to 9 meters, the covert rate will
increase 40%. Since the jamming signal treats as interference
in Bob, by reducing the distance between the jammer and Bob,
the covert rate is reduced. Moreover, the distance between the
jammer and Eve is effective. If their distance is 6 meter high,
the covert rate will decrease 63%. Also, when the jamming
signal is canceled, increasing of the distance between Bob and
jammer does not change the covert rate, and this parameter
does not affect on the covert rate.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the covert communication, the level of transmit power
is low which lead to low SINR hence we aim to exploit
from method without increasing the transmit power increase
the covert rate. Our strategy to increase the covert rate is
choosing the appropriate antenna in the transmitter to send the
information. For this purpose, we proposed a system with a
multi-antenna transmitter, a single-antenna jammer , a single-
antenna receiver, and a single antenna eavesdropper. In this
scenario, we encountered the optimization problem, which we
use to solve the method of DC. Moreover, we investigated two
different scenarios: 1) GNJ where Bob is unable to cancel
the jamming signal, 2) FJ scenario where Bob is able to
cancel the jamming signal. As the simulation results show,
by increasing the number of antennas which are selected
in the transmitter and choosing an appropriate antenna for
sending the information, it causes an increase in the covert
rate. Furthermore, the distance between transmitter and the
eavesdropper has more impact on the cover rate compared
with the distance between the transmitter and the receiver.
APPENDIX
Appendix A
It is simple to show that PFA + PMD is convex. In order to
calculate the minimum value of PFA + PMD, we derivative
PFA + PMD with respect to V and then we find the root of
it. Following this, we obtain the optimal V ∗ as follows
V ∗ = φ0φ1φ1−φ0Ln
φ1
φ0
+ σ2e . (28)
Appendix B
For the constraint C2, we can write
αDβje
(1−α)Dβae−αDβje
×
[
e
(1−α)Dβje
(1−α)Dβae−αDβje
ln(
αDβje
(1−α)Dβae )
−e αD
β
je
(1−α)Dβae−αDβje
ln(
αDβje
(1−α)Dβae )
]
=
αDβje
(1−α)Dβae−αDβje
× e
(1−α)Dβae
(1−α)Dβae−αDβje
ln(
αD
β
je
(1−α)Dβae
)
×
1− eln( αDβje(1−α)Dβae )
 > −ε. (29)
Therefore, we can rewrite the inequality (29) as
e
(1−α)Dβae
(1−α)Dβae−αDβje
ln(
αD
β
je
(1−α)Dβae
)
< ε.
which is equivalent to the constraint C2.
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